Monday, October 31, 2011
Something for Nothing
Of course, no one criticizes the David Ortiz trade that sent him to Boston, because there was no trade. The Twins tried to trade Ortiz and couldn't find anyone to take him. In fact, Ortiz was released only after being passed over by every major league team who could have had him for the waiver price if they were willing to offer him arbitration. Ortiz ended up signed by Boston for considerably less than he would have received if they had claimed him on waivers. But the other 29 teams clearly made a mistake, since it turned out Ortiz was well worth what he would have been paid. The point here, however, is the Twins ended up getting nothing for Ortiz.
Compare that to the JJ Hardy deal. The Twins got a couple of live arms, albeit with control issues. In addition they got rid of Brendan Harris's salary. Since, like Ortiz, the Twins had decided they weren't going to offer Hardy arbitration. This was a "something for nothing deal."
The same is true of Delmon Young. The Twins were not going to get anything for him if they non-tendered him. The decision to trade him to Detroit was another case of getting something for nothing.
Its important to remember that a players ability is only one factor in their trade value. Even when they still have value, it may not match their performance very well. When Johan Santana was traded, it wasn't "something for nothing", but it wasn't really a "Cy Young award winner" for prospects either. The Twins were only giving up Santana's last year with the team and a couple draft choices. The players they got in return had many season's ahead of them that the Twins controlled.
We may see some other deals this fall where the baseball value of the players traded doesn't seem to match. But you need to look at their value through the eyes of a GM. Sometimes trades are made to get something for nothing.
Thursday, October 27, 2011
Pitching is Key to Twins Contending Next Year
There has been a lot of discussion about the Twins need for another options at shortstop and better offense from their backup catcher. But the real issue for the Twins, as always, is their pitching staff. Regardless of what else happens next year, without better performances from their pitching staff the Twins are not going to be competitive.
One of the difficulties with evaluating a team's pitching is that it is more than the sum of its parts. The outs a team will need over the course of a season is relatively fixed around 1450 innings pitched (more if the team win a lot on the road, fewer if they lose a lot). That means the fewer outs a team's starters get, the more outs will have to come from the bullpen.
While there are exceptions, in general the more a pitcher pitches, the worse their performance will be. This is true for individual games and, for relievers, over periods of games. Whether it is true over the course of a season is a little more questionable, but it appears to have at least some effect on the bullpen. What that means is when starters pitch only a few innings in a game, the bullpen performance will start to suffer. There is a flip side to that effect that I think we saw happen with the Twins this year. When the bullpen is unreliable, the manager tends to leave starters in longer.
Overall, compared to 2010, in 2011 the Twins pitchers faced more batters and used more pitches for each batter they faced. The result was that they threw more pitches over the course of the season. The Twins starters threw 100+ pitches 68 times in 2011 compared to 61 times in 2010. In short, by almost every measure the work load on the Twins pitching staff was higher last year than the year before. That extra work was likely done by tired pitchers on the downside of their performance curve.
The point of all that is that, like a lot of things in baseball, the relationship between pitching ability and results is non-linear. Bad pitching tends to snowball into worse pitching. So what needs to happen to avoid the same problems next season? Where do the Twins get those 1450 innings pitched without relying on worn out pitchers?
The Twins have two starters set. Carl Pavano and Scott Baker both performed about as expected this year. Pavano has pitched over 200 innings the last two years and can probably be counted on to do the same again next season. Baker pitched well last season until he got hurt. Baker has pitched 200 innings only once in his career. He may do that next year, but I wouldn't count on it. Lets say 180 IP is a reasonably optimistic performance. It appears the Twins will go into spring training expecting Francisco Liriano to be in the rotation, although he could pitch his way out of that role. He can probably be counted on for 180 IP if he stays healthy and is reasonably effective. The fourth starter is probably a competition between Blackburn and Slowey (if the Twins decide to offer Slowey arbitration). Either one could pitch 160 innings even if they struggle, 180 if they are effective.
It sounds like the Twins plan to add another top starter - a guy you would project to give you 200+ innings. With that move, their starters would be projected to give them 940 innings. Diamond, Hendricks, Swarzak and Duensing are also possibilities. But it appears Duensing is going to end up in the bullpen and I don't the others are likely to win a starting spot unless someone else falls on their face. We can expect some combination of those guys to get a few spot starts for maybe 30 IP in 6 starts, many more if any of the starters are injured.
Those 970 innings from starters (that's about 6 IP per start) leave the bullpen to get somewhere around 480 innings pitched. To call the Twins bullpen "thin" right now is an understatement. Glen Perkins is the only reliable reliever returning. Mijares (who, like Slowey, is rumored a possible non-tender) and Alex Burnett are the only other two relievers who were significant parts of the 2011 bullpen. There is a possibility that Nathan will be back or, perhaps even Capps if Nathan goes elsewhere. Duensing, Swarzak, Diamond and Blackburn are all starters who may fall into the bullpen. They also have a handful of minor league arms that could fill in. But after Perkins, there is no one you would have any real confidence in.
In summary, the Twins need an established starter, a closer and at least one setup guy. Those are all much higher priorities than another shortstop, catcher or right fielder.
Monday, October 24, 2011
Can the Twins Contend Next Year?
Nonetheless, there are a lot of things that management has no control over and would help make the Twins a contender. In fact, most of them will probably have to happen no matter what else is done:
The obvious one is that the Twins need to get and stay healthy. If Mauer, Morneau and Span can't start in over a quarter of the games, the Twins are going to have a hard time being in contention. You can add Alexi Casilla to that list as well. The Twins lack of infield depth makes Casilla a critical component. He not only needs to stay healthy, he needs to settle in as a consistent presence in both the infield and the lineup.
They also need Baker to give them 180 IP, minimum and Pavano to approach 200. Some of the other Twins starters need to step up their game. Liriano, Blackburn, Duensing and Slowey are all candidates if they are still on the roster. Although it sounds like they may non-tender Slowey and move Duensing to the bullpen.
They need Ben Revere to hit a little and they need Danny Valencia to hit a lot more. They also need Valencia to improve in the field. Unless they are thinking about moving Plouffe to third, they really don't have any alternatives to Valencia. Revere is set as one of the three outfielders. His defense will be fine, but he needs to hit enough for his speed to be an offensive threat.
They need Glen Perkins to repeat his performance. And they need one or more of those hard throwers they have added to the bullpen to discover how to find the plate consistently.
The Twins might not need every single one of those things to happen. But they will need most of them to be competitive, regardless of the moves management makes. Of course management has a long to-do list as well.
Thursday, October 20, 2011
An Interesting Case for Being Careful with Statistics
The example below is more complicated, but probably even more pernicious because the problem is less obvious. Let me give an example to start the converstion with a question. Which of the following two players would you rather have come to bat with runners in scoring position given these career "slash" numbers with runners in scoring position*, AVG/OPB/SLG:
Player 1- .322/.383/.496
Player 2- .310/.527/.594
I think most of us would quickly choose Player 2 based on his superior power and OBP. In fact, it isn't really very close based on those numbers. But let me add these two non-standard stats:
Hits/Plate Appearances
Player 1- .278
Player 2- .200
Player 2 gets a hit 1 in 5 times he comes to the plate with runners in scoring position and Player 1 gets a hit over 1 in 4 times. And a similar thing happens when you look at total bases:
Total Bases/Plate Appearances
Player 1- .429
Player 2- .384
So which one would you rather have heading to the plate with runners in scoring position now? I think its Player 1 and not particularly close. What is happening is pretty obvious, Player 2 is walking a lot. Those walks reduce his at bats so that his AVG and SLG are both very high. Certainly an argument can be made that all those walks have value, even with runners on base. But I think what you are really looking for in that situation is a hit, not a walk.
BTW, Player 1 is Kirby Puckett and Player 2 is Barry Bonds. To some extents they are extreme examples. Bonds is way over the top in terms of walks and Puckett swung at, and could hit, almost any pitch anywhere near the plate. But if someone tells you batting average measures "how often" a batter gets a hit, that isn't really true. And if someone suggests that AVG does not reflect walks, that isn't really true either. The impact is indirect, but it is sometimes significant.
Sunday, October 16, 2011
Aging Players
There has been some discussion of aging current and former Twins players recently. The question is at what point does age really start to become a factor in predicting future success.
The generally accepted development curve suggests that players are likely to peak around 27 or 28. If you look at players with 300 or more at bats the largest number of players are age 27 followed by 28. About 1 in 3 of the players who got 300 at bats at age 28 will match that number at age 32. The other two thirds of players will get less than 300 at bats, because they are playing less, hurt or out of baseball.
What this means is that the General Manager of a veteran team is going to be running in place just to keep up with his teams natural tendency to get worse each year. If a team signs most of its best players to long term contracts when they are 28 or 29, they will likely find themselves saddled with a lot of underperformers before those players are 32 or 33.
This, I suspect, is one reason the Twins got rid of JD Hardy. Based on his performance in 2010 he did not look like a good gamble for the future. But it also raises serious questions about the Twin wish to sign "one or both" of Jason Kubel and Michael Cuddyer. Cuddyer is already 32 and Kubel will be past that point before any long term contract expires.
Baseball Reference has a formula for judging teams age weighted for how much players play. By their measure the Twins everyday players were the second youngest in the American League last year. Only the Royals put younger players on the field.
The Twins pitching staff, by contrast, was older than average. The pitching formula looks at starts, games and saves. Which means it may be putting too much weight on Nathan and Pavano. But if you look at the Twins rotation, Blackburn and Baker were 29, Duensing was 28, Liriano and Slowey were 27 . Those guys are moving into the downside of their careers or soon will be. None of them look like guys you want to extend long term contracts to - although they already have Blackburn and Baker under contract.
The key thing here is as I said in an earlier post, the Twins success depends on them replacing older players with younger players. There is always a risk in that. One reason teams prefer veteran players is that projecting their performance is a lot less volatile. But the price for that lack of volatility is almost certain decline.
Mauer and Morneau are both heading into decline. But they probably have a several productive years ahead of them if they can stay healthy. They may still be the core of the team. But the team isn't going to get better because they improve. That is going to have to come from young players taking other positions on the team. That means they shouldn't be adding a lot of veterans on long term contracts or resigning a bunch of their own free agents to long term contracts.
Friday, October 14, 2011
New Roster Moves
The STRIB is reporting that the Twins have removed four players from their roster. These include Matt Tolbert, Anthony Slama, Jason Repko and Rene Rivera. I discussed the 40 player roster decisions earlier.
The only surprise here is Matt Tolbert and it probably shouldn't have been. The Twins have several younger players in the middle infield who share Tolbert's ability to play multiple positions adequately.
The Twins now have 38 players on their roster. With Cuddyer, Kubel and Capps becoming free agents they will have 35 players left on the roster before considering which minor league players they need to protect from the rule 5 draft. There is also a possibility Nathan will become a free agent.
Of course the Twins apparently have targeted several positions for upgrades that might require roster spots. And they have said they plan to try to sign one or both of Cuddyer and Kubel. So not all five of those spots will necessarily be filled by prospects.
Update: Twins have also removed Dinkelman and Dutrait from the roster
What Happened with Nishioka?
Its interesting to read all the bloggers who continue to criticize Twins GM Bill Smith for his trades. Those complaints focus on Matt Capps, Delmon Young, Johan Santana and JD Hardy. As I have pointed out here, those trades, on balance, worked out by contributing to two division championships.
But there has been relative silence on the biggest disaster under Smith's leadership, the decision to sign Tsuyoshi Nishioka. They paid $5 million for the negotiating rights and then guaranteed him $3 million per year for three years.
Nishioka was a Japanese League batting champion and gold glove winner. He was expected to solidify the Twins middle infield playing at either shortstop or second base. In fact, he looked over-matched both in the field and at the plate. In fact, he looked worse than over-matched. And, of course, he spent a good portion of the season on the DL.
The DL issue was not really predictable, but there is still the question of what he was doing on a major league field in the first place. How did that happen? Did the Twins not scout him? Did they underestimate the differences in the game? Was Nishioka intimidated by the cultural transition. Is there a better player there that still might surface?
That last question will no doubt get answered over the remaining two years on Nishioka's contract. But if what we saw this year is what we get, Bill Smith needs to be asking some hard questions of the people who endorsed this move. Because the flaws in Nishioka's game seem to be manifestly obvious. They go well beyond the problems with young prospects like Trevor Plouffe, who struggle to make the transition from AAA.